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The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions
of Crawford v. Washington
Randolph N. Jonakaitt
As Roger Kirst points out in his contribution to this
symposium,1 a crucial assertion in Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court in Crawford v. Washington is that the Confrontation
Clause "is most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding."2 This conclusion can
be asserted with such certitude only by looking at confrontation
in isolation, segregated from its constitutional and historical
context.
The right of confrontation comes from the Sixth
Amendment, which states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
3
The only part of the Sixth Amendment that Crawford
discussed was confrontation. Justice Scalia's opinion, however,
gives no explanation why it can be concluded that the
Confrontation Clause constitutionalized common law as stated
in English decisions when other parts of the Sixth Amendment
expressly rejected English common law. This article will show
that English common law was not the source for much of the
Sixth Amendment, and by assuming that it was for
confrontation, Crawford's reasoning undercuts longstanding
Professor, New York Law School.
1 See Roger Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 35 (2005).
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The right to counsel provision
provides the most important example.
I. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND NOTICE AT COMMON LAW
The eighteenth century common law did not guarantee
a criminal defendant the right to counsel. Instead, it actually
prohibited the accused from having representation for serious
charges. The Treason Act of 1696 did grant a right to counsel
in treason cases, 4 and the common law permitted counsel in
misdemeanor cases, 5 but the common law forbade an accused
from being represented by counsel in all other prosecutions.
While the prosecutor was free to have counsel assist the
prosecution, under the common law, a person charged with an
ordinary felony could not have an attorney assist in the
development of facts. A defense attorney could help present
legal arguments, but could not present evidence, examine or
cross-examine witnesses, or address the jury in opening or
closing statements. If these actions were to be done, the
accused, unaided, had to do them.
6
An accused charged with murder, robbery, or smuggling
could not have counsel in England. While it is true that the
restriction on counsel started to break down in the eighteenth
century as English judges sometimes allowed defense counsel
to cross-examine witnesses, this practice did not really begin to
become institutionalized until the 1780s. 7 And, as J.M. Beattie
stresses, even when defense counsel were allowed a role in the
English felony cases,
[tihey did so under judicial sufferance, and . .. what they might do
for their clients was limited by the bench .... [11n particular, they
constrained defense lawyers' activities in such a way that the
accused were forced to continue to speak for themselves in court.
The right to full defense by counsel was not granted until the
passage of the Prisoner's Counsel Act of 1836. Until that legislation
was enacted, lawyers acting for accused felons were allowed to do
what the judges had always done for the defendant: to examine and
cross-examine witnesses and to speak to rules of law. Counsel were
not allowed, however, to act in those areas in which defendants had
always been on their own. In particular, counsel were not allowed to
speak to the jury on their client's behalf or to offer a defense against
4 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.).
5 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An
Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 84 (1995).
6 Id. at 82-83.
7 Id. at 93.
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the facts put in evidence. Until 1836, prisoners who said that they
wished to leave their defense to counsel were told that that was not
possible and that they must speak for themselves."
English common law did not have a right to counsel in
felony cases. The right did not even exist in England until
1836. The Sixth Amendment, however, grants a right to
counsel in all criminal cases. 9 Thus it is clear that the Sixth
Amendment did not adopt the common law right to counsel,
but in fact abrogated the common law rule prohibiting counsel.
The Sixth Amendment notice provision is similar. John
Langbein explains that the common law on notice
forbade the defendant from having a copy of the indictment
specifying the charges against him, not only in advance of trial, but
even at trial. Instead, the court clerk summarized the indictment to
the defendant upon arraignment. The Treason Act of 1696
abrogated the rule against allowing the accused access to the text of
the indictment, but only for cases of treason. For ordinary felony
cases, the rule endured throughout the eighteenth century, and it
impaired the defendant's ability to prepare his defense with
precision. "0
In English common law there was no right of notice in
almost all criminal prosecutions. The Sixth Amendment,
however, grants the right of notice in all criminal prosecutions.
This Sixth Amendment provision did not constitutionalize
English common law.
Since the Sixth Amendment did not constitutionalize
the common law right to counsel and notice, but instead
granted rights that did not exist at common law, there is little
reason to assume, as Crawford does, that the Bill of Rights
constitutionalized common law rights found in English
decisions. If Crawford had not isolated confrontation from its
context, but instead looked at the broader development of
criminal procedure reflected in the Sixth Amendment, the
Court should have seen that by the time of the Bill of Rights,
8 J. M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and English Criminal
Trials in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 230-31
(1991).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (beginning with "[iun all criminal prosecutions").
10 John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1994). Langbein also
notes that the English common law did not provide for the defendant's right to
subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf. The right to call witnesses in England was
not established until legislation was passed in the very late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, which was interpreted to provide for the right of compulsory
process. Id. at 1055-56.
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American trials had been following a path that diverged from
the English model in significant ways.11
II. AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL TRIALS PRIOR TO THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
The presence of defense counsel eventually changed
English trials from judge-dominated proceedings to adversarial
ones. 12  America granted the right to counsel long before
England; indeed long before the Sixth Amendment. Shortly
after declaring Independence, twelve of the thirteen states
guaranteed criminal defendants the assistance of counsel, but
going back as far as 1660 and 1701, a significant number of
colonies granted the right to counsel for felonies other than
treason. 13 As a result of these and other developments, 14 by the
1" In Crawford, Justice Scalia concluded that "the principle evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure ... ." 541 U.S. at 50. If so, then the Sixth Amendment as a whole had to be
rejecting, not adopting, much of eighteenth century English criminal procedure.
Felony trials without defense lawyers and notice were dominated by judges, thus
making the trials as a whole, not just pretrial examinations, like civil-law trials.
Professor Langbein explains:
[Wiell into eighteenth century the procedure we have seen at work in the Old
Bailey resembled the modern Continental more than the modem Anglo-
American procedure ....
(1) In the Old Bailey, as on the Continent today, lawyers for the prosecution
and defense were peripheral forensic figures, if present at all .... [Ilt was the
trial judge who examined the witnesses and the accused, and it was he who,
like the modern Continental presiding judge, dominated the proceedings.
(2) The accused took the active role in his own defense, speaking directly and
continuously to the court as he does today in the European systems. The
privilege against self-incrimination was not yet working to silence the
accused and distance him from the conduct of his own defense ....
(3) The Old Bailey trial judge deeply affected the adjudication of the
jury .... [H]e could speak vigorously on the merits and had many ways to
influence and control jury verdicts ....
John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 315
(1978). See also Jonakait, supra note 5, at 86-87:
Judges . . . controlled English common law trials through their dominance
over the development of facts at trial. That domination was intensified by
judicial authority over the jury. Judges did not treat jurors as autonomous
fact-finders, but instead treated them as a body bound by judicial views of the
evidence. Due to this judicial domination, criminal proceedings were closer to
present continental trials than to our modem ones.
12 See Jonakait, supra note 5, at 87-94 for a summary of the developments.
See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932). As Powell stated, "[tihe
[common-law] rule was rejected by the colonies." Id. at 61.
13 Jonakait, supra note 5, at 94-95.
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time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, American criminal
procedure had moved towards an adversary system that was
still unknown in England. The famous Boston Massacre trial
illustrates.
While British troops were occupying Boston in 1770, a
dispute erupted, and British soldiers killed three Bostonians.
Eight British soldiers, with John Adams as their lead defense
counsel, were tried for murder. In two trials, juries acquitted
six of these soldiers and convicted the other two of only
manslaughter. A transcript of one trial has survived, and the
proceedings of the other have been pieced together from
various sources. These historical materials reveal a trial
unlike those then prevailing in England.
Defense counsel acted as skilled advocates freed from
the constraints of the English common law. In defense of the
British soldiers,
John Adams and his colleagues cross-examined prosecution witness;
they called and examined defense witnesses; and they addressed the
jury, making both opening and closing arguments. They did not
undertake these functions in a neutral or objective manner, but
instead did so as advocates. They had a theory, self-defense or
justification, and the defense lawyers used their tools to further that
theory, just as a modern advocate would .... These were lawyers
acting as we expect modern defense attorneys to act, as advocates for
their clients in all parts of the trial. Not surprisingly, the records of
the testimony read much like modern trial transcripts. 15
The lawyers in the Boston Massacre trial were
operating within a system not known to the English common
law, and "[tihe key in the changed procedures seems to have
been the full representation by defense counsel, which was
14 The development of the public prosecutor also moved American criminal
procedure to an adversary system. Prosecutions for ordinary crimes in England were
not done by the state but privately prosecuted by the victim or a victim's friend. A
different process began to emerge here starting around 1700:
Public officials took responsibility for the prosecutions of crimes generally,
not just for the limited set of offenses that directly affected the sovereign. As
public prosecutors emerged, private prosecution in the colonies disappeared.
This evolution of the American criminal justice system was quick and
thorough. By the time of the Revolution, public prosecution in America was
standard, and private prosecution, in effect, was gone. Indeed, it was so
established and taken for granted at the inception of the new federal republic
that public prosecutors, although not mentioned in the Constitution, were,
without debate, granted exclusive control over prosecutions in the federal
courts.
Id. at 99.
15 Id. at 137-39.
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accepted without debate or comment in the ... trials."16 These
procedures were not put in place just for this trial but must
have been well established because "[1]awyers uncertain of
their advocacy role or its limits were unlikely to perform as
brilliantly as these lawyers did."
17
What Crawford's historical inquiry ignores is that
American criminal procedure in the framing generation was
simply not the same as England's; it had diverged in important
ways and rejected significant restrictions imposed by English
common law. It had shifted towards an adversary system
providing an accused with true defense advocacy on his
behalf. 18 Of course, it was this American procedure that the
Framers were most familiar with. It should be remembered
that the Bill of Rights was not designed to protect against the
English government but came into being because of local
concerns about the new federal government. If American
criminal procedure protected rights better than English law,
and it did, then the Framers would have wished to
constitutionalize American procedures, not English law. To
understand the history of confrontation and all other Sixth
Amendment rights, we need to study the criminal procedures
in the states when the Bill of Rights was adopted. It was these
procedures that were the most immediate source for the Sixth
Amendment. 19 That is at least what Justice Taney maintained
in an opinion that Crawford completely ignored.
16 Id. at 139.
17 Id. at 140.
8 Cf. 30 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6348 (1997) ("[W]e cannot understand the meaning of
'confrontation' by looking at that clause alone; we must also look at the other provisions
of the Sixth Amendment and to the Bill of Rights as a whole.").
'9 See Jonakait, supra note 5, at 112-13:
While both English mistakes and rights might have given rise to notions of
what needed protecting, Americans sought to protect rights viewed as
fundamental regardless of their origin. If Americans had developed a
criminal procedure thought to preserve fundamental rights better than the
common law did, then Americans would have wished to preserve these
rights .... If we want to know what confrontation was originally about, we
should not concentrate on English law, but on the criminal procedures in the
states when the Bill of Rights was adopted. It was these procedures, devised
by Americans and familiar to them through daily practice in state courts,
which were preserved in the Sixth Amendment.
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III. STATE PROCEDURES AS THE SOURCE OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In United States v. Reid,20 a man accused of murder
claimed that his compulsory process right was violated because
an evidentiary restriction prevented him from calling a co-
defendant as a witness. Justice Taney, writing for the Court,
noted that early Americans had partially adopted and partially
rejected the common law form of trials.21 Trial by jury had
been protected in all the colonies, but English common law
undercut this right by denying the accused compulsory process.
Although English statutes had modified some of the
oppressive mode[s] of proceeding[,] the thirteen Colonies who united
in the declaration of independence, as soon as they became States,
placed in their respective constitutions or fundamental laws,
safeguards against the restoration of proceedings which were so
oppressive and odious while they remained in force. It was the
people of these thirteen States which formed the Constitution of the
United States, and ingrafted on it the provision which secures the
trial by jury, and abolishes the old common-law proceeding which
had so often been used for the purposes of oppression.
22
Thus, in Justice Taney's view, while the Sixth
Amendment did adopt the jury trial provision from England, it
did not adopt the English method of conducting such trials.
The source for the procedure at trial "could not be the common
law as it existed at the time of the emigration of the colonists,
for the constitution had carefully abrogated one of its most
important provisions in relation to testimony which the
accused might offer."23 And, of course, the Sixth Amendment
also abrogated the common law on the right to counsel and
notice. Justice Taney concluded that the true source of the
Sixth Amendment is found in state law: "[Tihe only known rule
upon the subject which can be supposed to have been in the
minds of the men who framed these acts of Congress, was that
which was then in force in the respective States, and which
they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in
the State courts."24
20 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918).
21 See id. at 363-64.
22 Id. at 364.
23 Id. at 365.
24 Id.
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If the notice, right to counsel, and compulsory process
provisions of the Sixth Amendment were not adopting the
English common law, as Justice Taney's opinion suggests, but
adopting procedures that the states were already using when
the Bill of Rights was framed, surely the same is true for the
right of confrontation. Perhaps original notions of
confrontation had roots in English practices,25 but the
development of the Sixth Amendment indicates the
Confrontation Clause was constitutionalizing an American
concept that was built upon the conjunction of old and new
rights.26 Certainly, Justice Scalia's assumption that the
Confrontation Clause was constitutionalizing some sort of
English common law right cannot convincingly stand merely by
assertion when confrontation is seen in its Sixth Amendment
context.27 Indeed, without a hindsight bias, it is not clear that
25 Cf WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, at § 6344 ("Confrontation had a
history in America prior to the adoption of the Sixth Amendment .... The American
history is not a continuation of the story in England but a separate story that has
significant overlap and interconnection with events in England.").
26 The Framers of the Bill of Rights did intend for Sixth Amendment
provisions to work together, as indicated by one of the sources cited by Justice Scalia's
quotation. His opinion quotes from the pseudonymous Federal Farmer: "Nothing can
be more essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally before the
triers of the facts in question .... [Wiritten evidence ... [is] almost useless; it must be
frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing Letter from Federal Farmer IV
(Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 469, 473 (1971)) (alterations in original). The fuller quotation,
however, indicates that this Farmer believed that confrontation did not stand alone but
was supported by other rights. Federal Farmer also said:
When I speak of the jury trial of the vicinage, or the trial of the fact in the
neighborhood, I do not lay so much stress upon the circumstance of our being
tried by our neighbours: in this enlightened country men may be probably
impartially tried by those who do not live very near them: but the trial of
facts in the neighbourhood is of great importance in other respects. Nothing
can be more essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally
before the triers of the facts in question. The common people can establish
facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence; when trials of
facts are removed to a distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses,
oral evidence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties must depend on
written evidence, which to the common people is expensive and almost
useless; it must be frequently taken ex porte [sic], and but very seldom leads
to the proper discovery of truth.
Letter from Federal Farmer IV (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra, at 473
(1971). Federal Farmer's comments tied together two rights that are now in the Sixth
Amendment. The vicinage requirement helped assure cross-examination.
Confrontation and the other rights cannot be placed into an interpretive segregation,
for they were meant to work together to provide the accused with a fundamentally fair
trial. Cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, at § 6347 (noting that Federal Farmer
"saw the 'particular rights' such as confrontation as part of a system of justice rather
than as a disconnected series of rights").
27 Cf Kirst, supra note 1, at 83:
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a right of confrontation can even be found in the English cases
Justice Scalia discusses.
IV. WAS THERE AN ENGLISH COMMON LAW RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION?
Justice Scalia's research into English practices shows
that English courts argued over whether certain pieces of
evidence could be admitted into criminal trials without cross-
examination, but he presents no information that some broader
principle of "confrontation" controlled these decisions.21 A mind
not already committed to finding a common law right of
confrontation might simply have concluded that the English
cases were only concerned with the admissibility of one kind of
evidence, not a general right. Today, for example, we can find
many decisions about subsequent remedial measures. 29 When
we read these cases, we do not find some general "right" but
simply conclude that a certain kind of evidence is inadmissible.
Justice Scalia, however, has assumed that the Confrontation
Clause was incorporating a common law right of confrontation;
therefore, an English common law right of confrontation must
be discoverable. The cited English cases are assumed to be the
most relevant ones for determining that English right, and
then a right of confrontation is found in them.30 Without those
assumptions, that right is not apparent.3 1 If English history is
examined without a particular kind of American hindsight
bias, it simply is not clear that English common law at the time
of our Bill of Right's adoption actually had a right of
confrontation. Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, Justice
Scalia does not cite any English materials that used the term
English common law may be more accessible or more well-defined than
American common law, but Justice Scalia's survey of the historical record did
not provide any evidence that the original meaning was tied to English
common law. There is no mention of English common law in the statements
from the ratification debates quoted by Justice Scalia.
2 See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-47.
29 See FED. R. EVID. 407. See, e.g., the cases collected in Admissibility of
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures Under Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 158 A.L.R. FED. 609.
30 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-47.
31 This appears to be similar to what Professor Thomas Y. Davies, in this
symposium, described as "prochronism," which he said "occurs when more recent
concepts or events are erroneously projected backward into an earlier period." Thomas
Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 116 n.34 (2005).
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"confront" or "confrontation."32 Crawford states: "Early in the
18t1 century... the Virginia Council protested against the
Governor for having 'privately issued several commissions to
examine witness against particular men ex parte,' complaining
that 'the person accused is not admitted to be confronted with,
or defend himself against his accusers. '" 33 Thus, the earliest
citation Justice Scalia's opinion gave to the use of the term
"confront" comes not from England but from Virginia.
V. THE EARLY AMERICAN RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
While the English cases do not indicate that their
results are founded on some notion of a broader right, the first
relevant American decision after the Bill of Rights does base its
decision on a broad principle. The 1794 North Carolina case of
State v. Webb, however, did not base its decision on the right to
confront "testimonial statements," which Justice Scalia "found"
in the English cases and claimed was at the core of the
Confrontation Clause.- Instead, Webb stated, "it is a rule of
the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall
be prejudiced by evidence which he had not had the liberty to
cross examine." 35  It goes unremarked in Crawford that the
principle that compelled the result in Webb was different from
the one Justice Scalia found in the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford also completely ignored the first
interpretation of confrontation by a Supreme Court Justice.
Chief Justice John Marshall presided at the 1807 trial of Aaron
Burr.36 The prosecution sought to introduce out-of-court
statements made by the absent Herman Blennerhassett to one
Neale as declarations" of a coconspirator.37 Chief Justice
Marshall, relying on the right of confrontation, ruled the
evidence inadmissible:
32 Cf WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18, at § 6341 ("[Clonfrontation is rarely
mentioned in historical documents .... ).
33 541 U.S. at 47 (quoting A Memorial Concerning the Maladiminstrations of
His Excellency of His Excellency Francis Nicholson, reprinted in 9 ENGLISH
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 253, 257 (D. Douglas ed. 1955)).
' State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 104 (1794).
35 541 U.S. at 49 (quoting Webb, 2 N.C. at 104).
31 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
" The prosecution argued either that there was "a conspiracy between these
two [Blennerhassett and Burr] and others; and that the declarations of one conspirator
were evidence against the others; or, 2d, that they were accomplices." Id. at 193.
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The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which
excludes from trials of a criminal or civil nature the declarations of
any other individual than of him against whom the proceedings are
instituted, has been generally deemed by all essential to the correct
administration of justice. I know not why a declaration in court
should be unavailing, unless made upon oath, if a declaration out of
court was to criminate others than him who made it; nor why a man
should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his
absence, may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in the
preservation of which all are more concerned. I know none, by
undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more
endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of
every inroad on a principle so truly important. 38
Chief Justice Marshall went on to indicate that
coconspirator statements could be admitted to prove the crime
of conspiracy, but they could not be introduced to prove other
criminal conduct of an accused. Invoking the right of
confrontation, Chief Justice Marshall was excluding hearsay
evidence even though it was not an ex parte affidavit,
deposition, or other kind of statement elicited by the
government. Thus Chief Justice Marshall was not relying on
the English right of confrontation as found in Crawford but
apparently on an American notion of confrontation.
VI. IGNORING OTHER SIXTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
By segregating confrontation, Crawford not only ignored
necessary history, the Court also disregarded other Sixth
Amendment interpretations contradicting Crawford's
assumptions. For example, Justice Scalia cited the 1895 case
of Mattox v. United States for the proposition that the
Confrontation Clause "is most naturally read as a reference to
the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding." 39 Because
the Court ignored confrontation's Sixth Amendment context,
the Court could also ignore modern Sixth Amendment
interpretations that have rejected the approach of Mattox. This
is illustrated by decisions about the constitutionally required
size for a jury.
In the Mattox era, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution required a twelve-person jury. The defendant in
38 Id.
39 541 U.S. at 54 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
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Thompson v. Utah4° was convicted by a jury of twelve in the
Utah territory for calf-rustling, but he won a new trial. Utah
subsequently gained statehood, and Thompson was re-tried in
the state court by a jury of eight as provided for by Utah law.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial applied in the territorial courts and that,
whatever the normal powers of the state, any trial for a crime
committed before statehood had to provide a jury consistent
with the Federal Constitution. The Court then said that the
common law at the adoption of the Bill of Rights required
twelve jurors, and therefore this size jury was required by the
Sixth Amendment:
[T]he next inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the original
constitution and in the sixth amendment is constituted, as it was at
common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less .... This
question must be answered in the affirmative .... [Tihe word 'jury'
and the words 'trial by jury' were placed in the constitution of the
United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the
law as it was in this country and in England at the time of the
adoption of that instrument; . . . the supreme law of the land
required that [Thompson] should be tried by a jury composed of not
less than twelve persons . . . . [Tihe wise men who framed the
constitution of the United States and the people who approved it
were of opinion that life and liberty, when involved in criminal
prosecutions, would be not adequately secured except through the
unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.4
In 1970, however, when the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of the size of the jury required by the Sixth
Amendment, it took a different view of the Framers' intent.
Williams v. Florida 42 did conclude that the common law at the
time of the Constitution's adoption mandated twelve-person
juries, but it rejected the "easy assumption" that the Sixth
Amendment constitutionalized that common law requirement.
The Court stated, "[wihile 'the intent of the Framers' is often
an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history casts
considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past
decisions that if a given feature existed in a jury at common
law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the
Constitution." 43  Doubt is cast on that assumption partly
because "contemporary legislative and constitutional provisions
40 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
41 Id. at 349-53.
42 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
43 Id. at 92.
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indicate that where Congress wanted to leave no doubt that it
was incorporating existing common law features of the jury
system, it knew how to use express language to that effect.""
This is illustrated by "the Seventh Amendment, providing for a
jury trial in civil cases, [which] explicitly added that 'no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.' " 45  Williams then came to what would seem to be the
obvious and commonsensical conclusion - we can't really know
today what the Framers specifically intended in adopting the
Sixth Amendment provision:
We do not pretend to be able to divine precisely what the word jury'
imparted to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789.
It may well be that the usual expectation was that the jury would
consist of 12, and that hence, the most likely conclusion to be drawn
is simply that little thought was actually given to the specific
question we face today. But there is absolutely no indication in 'the
intent of the Framers' of an explicit decision to equate the
constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury.
46
Since the Framers' intent concerning size was
unknowable, the Court concluded that a functional approach to
the provision was the correct one. "The relevant inquiry, as we
see it, must be the function that the particular feature
performs and its relation to the purpose of the jury trial."
4 7
The modern Supreme Court has adopted a similar
approach to other Sixth Amendment provisions. For example,
it is clear that at common law an accused could not testify in
his defense." Even though the common law forbade such
testimony, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as Rock v. Arkansas makes clear, now grants an
accused the right to testify.49 The accused now has a right to
testify because the collective function of various Sixth
Amendment provisions, including confrontation, is to assure
4 Id. at 97.
41 Id. Cf Kirst, supra note 1, at 84 ("The Sixth Amendment's contrast with
the Seventh Amendment is evidence that the Framers did not use language clearly
intended to preserve the right of confrontation as it then existed in English common
law.").
46 399 U.S. at 98-99.
47 Id. at 99-100.
1 Maine was the first of the states to abolish this common law prohibition,
but not until 1859. The federal government did not permit such testimony until 1878.
See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961).
49 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) ("The right to testify is also found
in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.").
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that an accused has the opportunity to be heard in his own
defense, and today an accused's right to testify is necessary to
satisfy that constitutional purpose.50
These and other Sixth Amendment cases raise major
questions about the easy assumptions of Crawford and its
interpretive approach. The Court has held that even though
the common law clearly required twelve-person juries and
many of the Framers may have assumed that the requirement
would continue on, it cannot be known that the Framers and
adopters of the Bill of Rights specifically intended to
constitutionalize that specific jury feature. If that cannot be
known, how can there be such certitude that the Sixth
Amendment constitutionalized the much vaguer common law
right of confrontation if such a right did exist? On the other
hand, we can definitely say that the Framers did not
constitutionalize a right for an accused to testify in the
Compulsory Process Clause. Yet, that right exists. It exists
because of an interpretive approach that examines the
purposes of the Sixth Amendment in light of modern
understandings of those goals. Crawford could ignore this
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence only by looking at the
Confrontation Clause in isolation from the rest of the Sixth
Amendment.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF CRAWFORD
If Crawford's approach is correct, then it should be
correct for the rest of the Sixth Amendment as well, or at least
there should be an explanation of why some Sixth Amendment
provisions are bound by one interpretive approach and not
others. The Court's narrow focus allowed it to avoid such a
question, but Crawford's assumptions put at risk rights that
are clearly considered fundamental today. For example,
"[allthough there is little historical support" for the concept
that the Framers were constitutionalizing the right of an
indigent criminal defendant to have appointed counsel,51 such a
right is basic to the Sixth Amendment today. If Crawford is
5' See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
rights include, at a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.").
51 CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 901 (4th ed. 2000).
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right, shouldn't cases that grant indigents a constitutional
right to appointed counsel, such as Powell v. Alabama,52
Johnson v. Zerbst,O and Gideon v. Wainwright,54 be overruled?
Crawford's simplistic historical assumptions about
confrontation have called into doubt Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence as a whole.
52 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
53 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
